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THE MEASUREMENT of the relative capacities of tile states to
support selected services is rapidly becoming a major problem in
federal-state fiscal relations.' The increasing attention it is receiv-
ing is in large measure attributable to the unprecedented in-
crease in federal subventions to states 2 and to a strong feeling in
some quarters that present procedures employed in connection
with the allocation of federal grants among states are not satis-
factory.3
In brief, the critics of contemporary grant allocation proce-
1 The present writer wishes to mention his close association with J. T. Wendzel.
Chief, Economic Studies Division, Soda! Security Board, Washington. D. C..
while studying some of the related problems of income, 1isiI capacity, and variable
grants. For some time it has been the writer's privilege to act as fiscal consultant
to the Social Security Board, and in that capacity he had the pleasure of close co-
operation with Dr. Wcndzel, whose broad knowledge of general theory has aided
him materially in orienting his thought along specific lines with a vicw to
directing it toward the solution of more general problems. Though indebted to
Dr. Wendze!, the present writer assumes exclusive responsibility for the reasoning
and tentative conclusions in this paper.
2 In 1929 total federal subsentions to states, expressed as percentages of state
revenues, ranged from 2.4 for New Jersey to 484 for Wyoming. In 1934 the
minimum and maximum percentages were.g for California and 163.2 for South
Dakota. See P. H. Wueller and Associates, The Fiscal Capacity of the States: A
Source Book, Social Security Board, Bureau of Research and Statistics (2d ed.;
Washington, April 1938), Tables S-I and 1V.
3 Cf. Report of the Advisory Committee on Education (Washington, February
1938), Sec. B; also, Report of the llyrnes Committee (Washington, January ig).
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dures point out that present federal.suln'cntinspartake.Of tii nature of either non-match tugor constantratt
grants and thatneitherdevice is likely toenablethe rclatiel.
poor states to offer services of such qualityor (luantitas appears desirable to the critics. li)overcome what they considera socially detrimental Situation, theysuggest that cOHteznpiui'y
tCChuliqtjes he replaced or modified by 6 theintroductioiiof variablelatit) matchinggrants.7if the pohcy objectivesof the advocatesof variable grants are allowed, theiri lisistenceupon a change in federal allocation proceduresscentsjustified.Nofl_mat(-lijflg grants utay not elevate specific servicestandardsSubstafltjalI.in therelativelypoorer states, simply because thefunds awarded
may be used in lieu of, rather thati inaddition tO, Stf(,aJ)l)topt.ja_ Lions. Federalconstant ratio matchinggrants, on the oilierhand while requiring thestates to niatchi kdetal fundsas a conditioti of
the award, in no wayguarantee Inaintenan('c ofservice Standards on a desired level. Even ifwe assume that thestate accepts the grant and exerts a reasonable'tax effort by means of'reasonable' tax levies, state service standardswould, neverthelcss,be limited by the resources of thestate. The advocates offederal variable grants contend that thedifferenc5in resources of thestates are such as to make thcmaintenance of 'reasonable'service standards impossible in the relativelypoor states.
Inasmuch as theproponents of federal-statevariable grants have found the devicewhose use the advocateready-made in the fiscal tool chests ofthe states, itmay be well to indicate brieflythe nature of the type ofvariable grant that isat present used exten-
4 Non-niattggrants may be (lefinedas transfer paynlents fromone jurisdiction to another, for a spetilletipntposc, vhidi.hoi,il,their relativeIllagnimudemay be dde, zn ned partlybs imidies ofpIes(1,iit'cl need and tapa Itv . ,Io not require the receiving jt'fls(lit (Innto match the f,ijidcawar(le(l in anratio whatever. 5 A Constant ratto mat cht ng gran, isa transfer jxmmenifront one jurisdiction to a isother, (IeiglIJ ted fora spet I he Ittirpost'. svIlich, as a con(l (inn of awardreqtiir the receiving jurisdit,it,,ito luau Ii the fundsatam-(k'(I ininise proportion, the proI)ortio,taIits factor beingconsuiupj for all reccisiuigjurisdiciioiis. Seiiate Hill, S: 1265.76th Cong., 1stSets.
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sively in state-local fiscal relations. The introduction of variable
ratio matching grains by state legislaturesarose out of an institu-
tional situation in which certain publicservices were rendered
by subordinate, though semi-independent, jurisdictions. The
ratiooftaxable resources to the cost of specific services varied
among these jurisdictions in such a manner as to make it virtually
impossible for some jurisdictions to attempt to fInancea specified
service of 'reasonable' quality out of tax bases designated for local
exploitation. These grants pro'ide that the matching ratio
applicable to any one subordinate jurisdiction shall he some
function of the specific need and resources of the gTant receiving
jurisdiction. Typically, the grants are so constructed that as the
value of the specific need-resource ratio increases, the reimburse-
ment fraction increases in some legislatively designated manner.
The exact functional relation between specific need-resource
ratio and reimbursement fraction is determined by the politically
effective preconceptions obtaining in the larger community.
Generally speaking, the stronger the politically effective senti-
ment for equalization of service standards throughout the state,
the more pronounced the tendency on the part of the state legis-
lature to define service standards rigorously and to permit reim-
bursement fractions to vary with local specific need-resource
ratios in such fashion as to facilitate the rendering of a standard
service by all subordinate jurisdictions, provided these jurisdic-
tions exert a 'reasonable' tax effort of their own. Whenever
perfect equalization of benefits is the policy objective, state legis-
latures will not only define and make mandatory service offering
as well as local tax effort, but also provide that the difference
between the amounts produced by mandatory local tax effort
and the cost of the prescribed service be met out of state funds.
Such a subvention is usually designated an equalization grant.
Generalizing upon the various forces responsible for the intro-
duction of grants-in-aid into state-local fiscal relations, it may be
For a descriptive catalogue of grant-itt-aid formulae. see R. J. Hinckles. State
Grants-In-Aid', State of New York, Special Reportofthe Slate Tax Com-
mission ('935). No. 9. For a critical appraisal of the device, see State of New York,
Reportofthe New York Stale CommissionofState Aid to Municipal Subdivisions.
Legislative floe. No. 58 (1936); also, V. 0. Key, The Administration of Federal
Grants to the States (Chicago, 1937). and H. J. Bitter,nan, Slate and Federal
Grants-In-Aid (New York, ig8).440
PARrSVE\ observed that the desirefor inter-jurisdictional
transfers ofta funds was generatedby public sentimentin a stateas a whole insisting upon the generalproustoti ol a standardor ifliutmuni level of sometype of service despite (a)a historically
cOliditionetj situation under whichthe operatingfunctionscoincjdetitalto the performance ofthe service inquestionwere actuallyper. formed by subordinatethoughsemi-independentgovernment agencies; (b) markeddifferences either infiscallyexploitable resources or levels of socialconsciousness, which,as thecase might be, made iteither financiallydifficult, ifriot impossible,or unattractive forsome minor jurisdictionsto offerservicesor facilities of the qualitydemanded bypotent groupswithin the larger community.Typically, whenthe emphasisof thestate legislature has beenupon stimulation of localtax effort,constaiti ratio matchinggrants have beenemployed, andwhen thelegis- lative intent hasaimed atsome degree ofinter-jurisdictional equalization of servicestandards, variableratio matchinggrants have been pressedinto service.
When the agitationfor federal-statevariablegrants began, students as wellas policy makersattempted to followthe state- local procedurepattern closely. Theyset to work,attempting to measure the fiscal capacityoE the states,by constructingso-called model taxsystems, applyingthese systemsto the economiesof the differentstates, and measuringthe states' fiscalcapacities in terms of the differencesin tax yieldsallegedly derivablefrom the economies ofdifferent states.1°
With thepassage of time, itwas increasinglyfelt that this approachwas unsatisfactory,"because, inessence, it defined the states' capacitiesto performcertain publicfunctions interms of the investigator'spreconceptionsregarding theproper relation
The term fiscalcapacity may beIeritalively definedaa given insestigatOr's conception of theproper ratio oftaxes coHeciibkto some nteasI,reor selected measures of wealth.
in For anillustration of thisprocedure, seeMabel Nesseomer,An Index of Taxpaying Abilityof the Stales(Bureau of Publications,I co her', college. Colum bia University,'935); also L. L. Chism.The EconomicAha1:1if the States 10 Finance PublicSc/tools (Bureauof Publications,'Feacher', College, Columbia University, ig6).





































RELATIVE CAPACITIES OF THE STATES 441
of the private and public economies of the different statcs.'
Increasingly, the interest of those concerned with federal-state
variable grants has shifted from attempts to define and measure
the fiscal capacities of the states in terms of some necessarily
higher subjective frame of reference to possible approaches to the
proximate measurement of the states' capacities to support essen-
tial or desirable services regardless of whether these services are
made available through the instrumentalities of the private or
the public economies.'3
In the following pages an attempt is made (i) to investigate the
possibilities of using income as a basic gauge in approximating
the relative capacities of the states, (2) to consider what seem to
12 In passing. another serious methodological defect of the model tax system ap-
proach may be pointed out. All model systems are but idealizations of contemporary
state-local tax systems. Hence, somewhat more than half of the yield of any one
of the systems, when applied to the economy of a given state, is cicmivetl from
capital base taxes. Capital value is essentially a long run coilcept. imnplpng
perpetuity. Contrariwise, fiscal capacity, to be of significance for variable grant
purposes, must be essentially a short run concept. relating to some suchperiod
as one fiscal year or a few fiscal years. If capital valuesand fiscal capacity are
to be related, the time periods with which either concept isassociated must be
made comparable. Formally, this may be done either (a) by as.sociating the concept
of fiscal capacity with a time period of indefinitely long duration, or (b) byad-
justing the capital value or values in question. by introducing what may becalled
a liquidity coefficient. The first solution ismeaningless relative to the problem in
hand, because what is to be measured is possible tax effort, that is, themaximuns
ratio of taxes collected to some measure of wealth over a relatively shortperiod.
The second solution, while not meaningless, is cumbersome,unless one can
conceive of a liquidity coefficient that is independent of the inconse that hasbeen
derived or has a high probable derivability in the immediate future. Inaddition.
there is reason to believe that the model tax system approachinvolves double
counting of the same wealth phenomena. For instance, in addition tothe capital
value base, represented in the main by realty taxes, the model systemsoperate with
a personal income tax. To be valid, thisprocedure presupposes that the ratio
of taxable income derived from real estate to all othertaxable income is constant
for all states. On the basis of the limited evidence available,it would seeni that
the assumption in question is not substantiated byobservable facts.
In the present imsstitutiomialset.Up.the private econom would seem to differ
from the public primarily by visiue of differences inmotivating forces and the
criteria by reference to which their respective operating efficiencies arejudged. In
the private economy the motivating force would seem tobe the chaimcc at profit
realization and the operating criterion, the magnitudeof the positive difference
between out.paments and receipts. Contrariwise, themotivating force in the
public economy would seem to be the production ofservices that are not pro-
duced in desired quantity or quality irs response tothe profit motive and the
performance criterion, the judgment of the politicallyeffective sector of the social
group, a judgment typically notsusceptibleLOpecuniary acquisitive tests.442 I'ARL
be sonicflbljuipIOt)leliIs at tCtl(lIhgC Urien t at t dnJJ)ts to(level01) federal-state variable grant prtportieuialityfactors onflk'I)
of differcitces in the incomes of the residentsof thevarious states
For purposes of first apprOXimation,it Seems usefulto think
of a definable social group asa ch)SCd Ui)ivcrsc whose rai.wn(l'er
is the establishment of relations designedto facilitate theprothic. tion and distribution of those goods andservices itsCOflStjILiChlt parts consider essential or desirable. Ifwe postulate the desir-
ability of maintaining the group's capitalintact, the rate atwhich desired goods and services becomeavailable at an instaiit intime
may be conveniently thoLiglit of as beingmeasured by therate of flow of income producedat that instant.'
Though for Some operatbus the Concept of i noonICproduced is useful, it seems inadequatefor the purpose ofapproximatj,g
the relative capacities of thestates, simply because it isnot in its
entirety aIlocaI)le among thestates,'5If a jurisdictiona'locus is to be assigned to income, theconcept of income paidout 18
Personal income must apparently beutihife(I, The incomepaid outthat accrues to theresidents of a givenstate measures the
income producedmay he dei.iied as the marke, value of allcommoditj produced plus ihc market salueof all lwrsotial scrvicesrendered minus the market value of the fractionof the group's sLot k of goodsthat was destroed coincicicittal to ilic productionof both goods and serskesoser a given interval. CI., Si mon KU!mlCts, Xationajlnro,nu', I Q2c-, 0 2, Senate I)octat.d Cong., ud
Sess. (Washington, 1934),p. ..
15 This statement isriot intended to imply that iiwoi,eproduced could not be allocated among thestates if one chose to postulateinstitutions haskailv dif- ferent from those rtI)scrsalslcin the COflIetIlporary UnitedStates. Such allocation and actual transferpresuppo..es the establishcue and enlOrcenierit of rules ac- cording to whkh it isto be nude, I he Ior,nulat ionof sudu rules iniplics that the marker is superMaled bysome toIahitariti, authot itv thatperforms the allocation. This paper, hoiseserprocceths on thassuu,1,t ion that tilerita, Let is to he re- tamed as therinzar allocatingagent of income Sec R. R Nathan,Part Six. 1Income paid out is debitedas the "mo,,cy receipts anti themoney equisalents of the recipts in kind",whirl, accrue tonat ,,,al persons ocr a giveli inteisal of titHe. Cf., Ku,nets,o. cit., p.i-Ihie diticre,,te hietweetiinunuc produced arid Income paid out usercansparalihe inlcrsals of time ismeasured hibusinessv- ings, positiveor negative,
17 For the sake ofbresity, inconiepaid nut svill henceforth be referredIn as inConte. However, the genictalsentiment of the (:onlcrenceon Rescanh in Na- tiojial Income aridVctjth has hcn toreserve thterminitonic' For 'income pro(Iticc(l' Zlfl(lto designate what hasbee,i calledincome paid out' hthe term 'agglegate ofIliconie pa'. titcnnto mdi'. iduals'. 5cc Siwli,-'., 101IO?1CS UriC and Ta'j,. -RELATIVE CAPACItIES OFT lIE STATES 443
rate at which goods and services become available to its residents
in both their individual and collective capacities1
If the above considerations are allowed to stand, personal in-
come accrued to the residents may be looked upon tentatively
as a measure that makes it possible to compare the relative
capacities of different states. However, before the possibilities of
comparing the states by means of the income measure are con-
sidered in detail, it seems necessary to introduce an institutional
complication. So far the argument has proceeded on the assump-
tion that the income accrued to the residents of a given state may
be devoted entirely to the purposes of the state's private and
public economies. This assumption, though convenient, does
violence to the facts, because the federal government draws upon
these incomes by means of federal taxes.
If it could be safely assumed, as apparently it sometimes is,'5
that the ratio of federal tax collections to the income of the resi-
dents of the states is constant, the impact of federal taxes upon
the income of the residents would in no way affect therelative
capacities of the states. However, the nature of federallevies.
taken in conjunction with observable differencesin the fiscally
significant sectors of the frequency distritnitions of stateincomes
as well as differencesin state institutions, lends credence to the
belief that the impact of federal taxes upon stateincomes varies
widely.
Concretely, the severity of the impact offederal taxes upon the
incomes of the residents of different statesis influenced by
is Strictly speaking. income paid out asdefined aboe measures onis the rate
at which goods and servicesfurui;hed through the moue' exchange eroiiOniv
become available at an instant in time.To get a more adet1uate measure of
wellare levels,all goods and seryices furnishedthrough channels other than
the exchange economy could beadded to the first. For purposes ofmeasuring
welfare levels or relative state capacities.the ideal concept would dehne income
asthe algebraic sum of (a) the marketvalue of rights exercised inconsumption.
and (h) the change in the value of the storeot proper:s rights' over anintersal
of time. Cf. H. C. Sinioris.Personal iniome Taxatwu Chicago.5937). p. r,o.
Failure to take account ofnon-market economy senices is likek tointrodii&e
an error into the determinationof the relative eapacities ofthe states, unless
it ean he established that theratio of non-market econoIi1goods and sersices
to market economy goodsand ser'.ices is the sante forall stales. SudenLs of
national income have, however.strefiLlousi' objected to includingchanges in
the value of existing propertyrights. Le.. capital gains, innational income. See
espcciallt'olu,ne One, Part Fotir.
19 Senate Bill, 5: I2fi, op. cit.444 PART
numerous factors, such as (a) the frequencydistrjhtjtj11of pei. sonal income withina given staLe; (b) the typeof taxSysten which obtains in a givenstate; (c) a state's basic insti
Inasmuch as both federalpersonal incometax rates andfed. eral estate tax ratesare, respectively, increasingfunctions of personal income and net worthof estates, thratio of federaj income taxes and estatetaxes paid and payableto iflcoof residents increases as the positiveskewness of thein(ome fre- quency distribution increases. Inother words, thefiscally signift. cain sector of a state's frequencydistribution ofpersonal inconies is a determinant of federaltax impact. There isample evidence that the value of thisdeterminant is niarkedlydifferent for different states.2°
Further differences in theimpact of federaltaxes upon the residents of differentstates reliect differen(-esin the fiscalsystems of the states inrespect of the quantitativeimportance of special assessments or bettermenttaxes. Bettermenttaxes, incurrent practice, are deductiblein determiningliability underthe fed- eral income tax. Hence,as the ratio of bettermenttax collections to total tax collectionsincreases, the impactof the federalincome tax upon the income ofthe residents ofa given state decreases.
Again, there isevidence that the impactof the federalestate tax is not uniformthroughout, Itis sometimesalleged that the Treasury. indetermining the valueof the realestate component of a givenestate, is guided byand perhaps leansheavily upon localassessments Hec, themarket-assessed value ratiosthat prevail in a givenstate must be admittedas a determinant of federal tax impact.Last hut not least,the impact of bothfederal personal income andestate taxes varies withthe presence or absence of the IflStitUtjoof communityof property ina given state. The relativeimportance of thisfactor cannotnow he ex- pressed quantitativel,although itspresence in some states but not in othersPresumably tendsto distort the picture.Likewise. the impact offederal excisescan hardl' he assumeduniform. To mention butone Outstandingillustration, thereare still some nominally drystates, despite therepeal of the eighteenth amendment
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RELATIVE CAPACITIES OF THE STATES 445
The above instances are cited merely to cast doubtupon the
apparently widely held belief 21 that the impact of federal taxes
can reasonably be presumed to be uniform throughout the states.
It would not seemto require labored argument to show that,
inasmuch as there is a strong presumption that the impact of
federal taxes varies from state to state, all federal taxes paid out
of personal income must be subtracted in order to obtain the
income totals at the disposal of the residents of the states which
measure their general capacity.22
Comparison of total state capacities,23 adjusted for differences
in the impact of federal taxes, is not socially meaningful unless
related to general need or presumed general need. It seems
reasonable to assume for purposes of first approximation that
general need, in contradistinction to a specific need or selected
specific needs, is directly proportional to population. If this
assumption is accepted, total income of residents, adjusted for
net federal drains and divided by total population, or per capita
income,24 would seeni to furnish the foundation for quantitative
21 Subscription to this belief seems to be implicit in the model tax system approach,
for, in essence, that approach seems to proceed upon the assumption that the
application of a given tax system to the economies of different states will abstract
like percentages of the liquid wealth of different states. Cf. footnote to above.
22 The amounts of the income of residents of a given state abstracted by means
of federal taxes during one interval of time accrue in the form of income to
the residents of the same state or other states at a succeeding interval. In other
words, if the time interval chosen for computation purposes is selected judiciously.
the results of the computations for the different states will represent personal
income of state residents minus net federal drains.
23 The above definition ol capacity implies that the market is accepted as the
arbiter of state income allocation. It has been suggested from time to time that
income originating is a superior criterion for the purpose in hand to income
actually accrued. This view, of course, rejects the arbitration of the market.
but fails to suggest a satisfactory substitute. In practice, the proponents of this
view would urge that the income of the stockholders of an oil company originated,
say, in Texas. and that partofit should have been kept in Texas in the first
place by meansofseverance taxes. The advocatesofthis view, however, fail to
specify the nature of ihe standard by reference to which they would determine
how much should have been kept in the first place. In view of the contemporary
scramble for revenues, there is good reason to believe that Texas. or for that
matter any other state, keeps. its the first instance, as much as competitive con-
ditions allow.
24 See Nathan, Part Six, for a discussion of some of the statistical difficulties in
obtaining per capita income., ,-
PARI'
approximation of the relative general capacitiesOf tlW (lifer.
ent states.
According to this reasoning, per capitaiilcOmcs aslileasured over a given interval indicate the rclative general
('apacities of
the states. When factored they may be designatedc011e('ti\elyas
the general capacity series or capacity in(lexof the States.Inter-
preted in terms of more or less, this iiiiexmakes posihlethe
generaliiauon that a state that is associated witha flhlniher of
smaller value than some other state hasa lower capacit thanthe
second state. In other words, thecapacity index, constructedon
the basis of income accrued to theresidents of thestates over a
past interval, facilitates measurement of thedifferences that
obtained in the respective states'general capacitiestO satisfy
competing spect tic needs over that interval.
Before possible uses of the indexfor federal-statevariable
grant purposes arc considered, itmust l)e pointed out that the
index describesa situation that is in equilibrium, in thesense
that during the interval inquestion the federalgovernment has
completely redistributed alltax funds collected during the inter-
val. 1-lence, upontermination of he interval, the federalgovern-
ment is without funds to redistribute bymeans of variable grants
or any other reallocation device. If theprinting press is disre-
garded, all federal hindstoi)CredistributedUJX)iltermination of the intervalmust be obtained either by (i) additionaltaxation
or () the withdrawal ofsome federal sul)vention made during
the interval byreference to which the capacityindex was
constructed.
If we assume that policymakersdecide to obtain federal
25 'the tel-ni generalcapaeüv mar he definedas the ellcciire power of a definable social group to satisfCompeting specific needson a certain level.
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funds for reallocation among the states bymeans of additional
taxation, it goes without saying that the capacity index must be
adjusted to take account of the additional federal drainsupon
the incomes accruing to the residents of the states. Again, ifwe
assunie that the funds to be reallocated by means of variable
grants are to be obtained by withdrawing a previously granted
subvention, the capacity index must be adjusted to take account
of the withdrawals.
Once the decision regarding the sources of federal variable
grant funds has been made,27 the properly adjusted capacity
index, it would seem, could be utilized in connection with the
determination of the variable grant proportionality factors, on
the basis of which the federal government would match state
appropriations for one service or for selected services. One simple
solution suggested by the above argument would utilize the
reciprocals of the components of the capacity index as propor-
tionality factors.28 Such a procethire is not only feasible but might
be rational if the federal government made variable ratio block
grants 29 to the states and permitted the states to budget the sum
total of their receipts, including federal grants, as their judgment
dictated.
jute the attainment of the given ends. Ever since the publication of E. R. A.
Seligman's Thea' and Praclice 01 Proessive Taxation, in the 'nineties, it has
been an article of faith with legislators that the overall effective tax rate assessable
against taxpayers should he sonic increasing function of income magnitude. It
is suggested that while this view may have lweii entirely reasonable when taxes
absorbed hut a small fraction of national income, itis essentially static in the
sense that itfails to consider the probable effects upon the future behavior of
aggregate income and hears reinvestigation.
?T If federal variable grant funds are ohiained In the withdrawal of some current
federal subvention, e.g., the present constant ratio niatcliing grants, the cost of
variable grants to the Treasury might conceivably be lower than the cost of
currently made subsidies.
28 The capacity index would apparently continue to serve a useful purpose eveis
ii the proportionality factors were not allowed to vary over so wide a range as
might be indicated by the capacity reciprocals. The extent of the range over
which it is desirable to allow proportionality factors to vary must he determined
in large measure by (i) the decision as to the degree of equaliiation desired: (2)
the sources of federal funds; () the probable sources of state matching funds.
29A variable ratio block grant may be defined as a transfer pa%ment from one
jurisdiction to another, which is not designated for SHIV specific purpose, hut which
as a condition of award requires the receiving juris(ltction tomatch the funds
awarded in some proportion, the proportionality factor being sonic function of
a given receiving jurisdiction's general iseed and fiscallyexploitable resources.
447': 4
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However, theuse of the (q)acit% reciprocals.
whUfl CiBf)Jo.ed as proportioiiality tactolsIfl(Oflflectionvith theavaiding of variable ratio matchinggrants for .ceci/zed Juncijo,i
iflq)lies subscription to the postulate thatspeci fic needs aic
P'OPoFtional to general needs. I'ubljcopinion, whose ticttim nw.lie ten[a tively accepted,apparently does iiotSUt)Scribe tO thi5proposi tion.° Nevertheless itWould seem that thecapacity recipro(.aIs suggested above could beput to use even thoughtheproportioi ality of general andspecific needs isfbigranted. Absetiteof P10})Ortioflality,if more thanan tnlsubsfa,1(jate(tClaim,is measurable .4 priori, thereSCCIUSflU reason(I)SflsI)ect that the measured specific iieeddifferences couldnot heassociatedwith the capacityreciprocals. The combinatic,iiof need differences and capacityreciprocals might then he05c(!as l)rolrtio,lit factors inConnection with thealloatiun ofvariable grants for specific functions,provided the reasoningthat has ledto the development ofcapacity recipro(-a Is isa(ceptcd. If the majorConsideratjis set forthabove aregranted, the followinggenerali,atioi5seeiii valid: (a ) the)rOhlein Presented by federal-statevariable ratio nlatchil)ggrantsispaitnariI a proli- lem in territorialor Jurisdictionalilicoliie tratisfers, and,as such, implies the problemof I)etSollal raiisfers;(2)inasnnich as the raison d'êtreof variablegrants is luconiC transfers,fleas- tired incomedifferefl(es mustenter Iliti) thecomposition of the Proportion;ility factors forwhich suchgrants provide; (j) state per capitaincome differencesflwastlre the (lifkreauesin the states' generalCapacities to satisfycompeting specific needs; (4) hence, the factoredstate per capitaincome reciprocals may serve as federal_statevariable grantproportionalit.factors: () if differences inselecte(l SI)ecilicneeds arenot j)Ioport ioiial to differences ingeneral need, the(Icvjatiiis muhe measurable, and, ifmeasural)le theymay heifltIo(l(mcejas J)Ioportionality factor Coethcieiits
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In conclusion, the writer would like to point out that his
observations are not offered as the solution to the federal-state
variable grant problem. Rather, he has essayed to define and
relate what seem to him the significant variables that characteriie
the issue. If his suggestions stimulate further and better thought,
he will have accomplished his aim.I)iscussion
I GERHARDCOLM
Dr. %Vuellersuggests in his thoughtfulpaper that variable matching ratiosshould he used inallottinggrants and thatthe ratios should\'ar) according to theGlj)aCit iCS andUCCdS of the states. He argues thatgeneral ucc(1can he representedby popula- tion figures an(l thatcapacitY can heiIWdStiretl l)\incomere- ceived. I-Ic thereforesuggests that theratios be modifiedaccord- ing to a reciprocalin(Iex ofincome per caj)itafor thevarious states. This proposalhas the greatadvantage ofsimplicitycom- pared withsuggestions to baSegrants oiiinure specificmeasure- ment of fiscalcapacity and need.I agree withI)r. \Vnehler's prox)sal butwish to examinetwo isstIlehjctioiis. First, itmay be (1uesuonedwhetherincome is really thebest availablemeasure of thecapacity of a state.Dr. Wuellcrsuggests this methodas an alternativeto the attemptsto measure fiscal capacity by usinga 'model system'of state andlocal taxation.1 do not discusshere the adjustmentsof incomercccivcd proposed by I)r. \Vuchlcr,but assume thathe appliesa measure of income at the disposal (ifindividuals,business,'associations, and public authorities. Incomereceived thensecnis adequatelyto measure the funds availablefor thesatisfaction ofpuhli( as wellas pri- vate needs. Thepoint has beenmade h- Mr.Martin that although Dr.\Vuellcr objectsto the a pplicationot a 'model tax' system, sucka system is implicitin hisown proposal. ItWas argued that usingunoine asaardstickol capacity isjustified only if individualinwme taxesarc regardedas the ideal method of taxation,and if thepossibility of businesstaxation is neglected. Such a criticismmay he ill ust ratedhthe hollowingexample. (:onsidei- twostates. A and B,w'liose residentsreceive thesame
























income. A has large factories which ship gcxxls throughout the
country afl(l which disburse earnings to security holders through-
out the country. B is a rural state with small scale production,
where income produced is identical with income received. A's
fiscal capacity is apparently greater than B's because A can in-
crease its revenue at the cost of other states by various methods
of business taxation. Such business taxes may either absorb some
of the profits which otherwise would go to the security holders
residing outside the state or, if prices increase because of these
taxes, they may absorb consumer purchasing power. Dr. Wueller
disposed of this argument by assuming that the revenues raised by
such business taxes must appear somewhere in the income re-
ceived; e.g., in the income of teachers or officials of that state. He
assumes that "in view of the contemporary scramble forrevenues"
each state already taxes business "as much as competitive condi-
tions allow". It might be concluded from this statement that an
increase in such business taxes could not change the relative
capacity of a state. To my mind such a conclusion would not be
valid. It is true that a single state cannot increase business taxes
without due consideration of the tax policy of competitive states.
But if all states increased these types of taxes equally, itwould
not mean that time fiscal capacity of all stateswould be increased
in the same proportion. States with relatively moreproductive
facilities employed in interstate commerce and finance would
increase their capacity more than states withpredominantly
local production or states in which many security holdersreside.
However, if the states make more use of this tax sourcefor
internal fiscal purposes the increased tax revenuewill appear
somehow in the income received (unless the moneyis spent for
purchases from other states). Therefore it seenis to methat the
measurement of capacity by incomereceived does not involve
an implicit assumption of amodel tax system, hut that it is to
a certain extent determinedby the tax system actually used.
This argument to my mind is not of very greatpractical impor-
tance. Possible objections againstusing either 'income produced'
or a 'mo(lel tax system' seemof much greater weight. I therefore
agree with Dr. Wueller'spractical conclusion.
A second objection might beraised against the assumption
that the population can be used as a measureof general need. It452
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seems to me hat thereare dilferenres in the(This requiredli)1 satisfying public andprivate needs fromstate to state,So that a different portion of thecapacity is absorbed infulfillingthe same type of service invarious states. The(i)StS of shelterare different in variousregions. 1)ifferentexpenses arerequired for protection against cold, andsimilarly, thecosts ofgovernment services differbetween sparsely anddensely settledregions, between rural andindustrial areas,between plainsandmout. tains. If a northernstate shows incomeper capita fourtimesas high as a southernstate it would hardly beright toconclude that the northernstate is four timesas well equipped forfulfilling additional statefunctions. Yet. Ihesitate tosuggest thata (lirect measurement of general needshould he appliedas one variable in the matchingratio. Themeasurement of standardhousehold COStS ifl various regionsis not yet sufficientlyaccurate for sucha practicaluse and themeasurement of standardgovernment costs has hardly beenattempted. Untilmuch moreprogress has been made inthis respect. theuse of per capitafigures asan approximationseems justified.
The use ofincome per capitaas the basis of variablematching grants has two defects.First, suchan index makesno allowance for the fart thatit is more difficultto collectmoney from individ- uals witha generally lowincome level than fromwealthy indi- viduals or largecorporations. Itmay be assumerl thatthis tend. ency acts against thestates with lowincomes per capita. On the otherhand, the omissionof the directmeasurement of general, privateand public needmay act against theinterests of the wealthierstates since there issonic reason tosuppose that in these statescosts for privateand publicgoods and servicesare higher than inthe states withloweraverage incomes. It is difti- cult to saywhich of theseopposite tendenciesis mole iuipOrtaflt. If it is believedthat the secondtendency outweighsthe first, the matching ratiosshouldvary less than theinromime per capita fig- ures. The inadequate
measurement of needalso leadso the conclusion thatgrants for specific
PtITPOSCS must he basedon a gauge that includesa directmeasurement of specificneeds (e.g., housing,unemployment,costs of education).Here again we support a practicalproposal of I)r.Wuellers bya somewhat differentargument.DISCUSSION 453
II E. L. DULLES
The manner in which state incomes are measured is clearly
dependent on the purposes for which measurements and rank-
ings based on these measurements are used, as brought out in
the discussion of Dr. Wueller's paper. I think there may be some
misconceptions prevalent as to the nature of the purposes that
now influence practical procedures in the United States. The
comments on model tax programs for states and on the measure-
inent of state capacity made earlier by educational and other
groups seem to me to indicate clearly the possibilities of mis-
understanding tendencies today and tomorrow.
In my opinionand it must remain an opinion rather than a
factthere has been a marked departure from the earlier ideas.
Those now working in the field tend, with certain exceptions, to
stress not the importance of influencing the fiscal policy of the
states in a constructive way or even of measuring capacity rela-
tive to need, a somewhat later development, but of looking at
the matter to a considerable extent as a question of equalizing
the flow of purchasing power and the demand for consumers
goods. Combined with this effort is the hope that this will in-
crease national stability and expand national production. Im-
plicit in some recent ideas relatt e to comparison of states is the
notion that if we can 'prime the pumps' of demand and produc-
don in certain states, the nation as a whole will benefit and
uppoii unemployment be reduced. Some may question the efficacy of a
program based on such an idea others may accept it but I think
one must watch carefully in the consideration of any set of rank
ings or any comparisons that may become available in the future
to see whether there has been a shift toward this particular
perd' approach. I am inclined to think that the Byrnes' bill does repre-
sent this approach, and that the Wagner bill combines something
of this idea with an attempt to emphasize need. Dr. Wueller's
discussion of net federal drains is pertinent in this connection.
It would carry no weight with those who wish to stress the pur-
chasing power equalization whereas it has more significance to




1)r. Wueller'spaper deals with theeconomic capacits- ofthe states and takes noaccount of the politicaliIiStItLitiOflS by which
economic capacity is COnvCrtC(lintO f)Ul)lit revenueand the means of supporting publicfunctions. For example.the distribu- tion ofincome has beeti mcnuone(lUI the foregOingdiscussion and theopinion expressed that it shouldnot be leFt out ofthe pic- ture in determiningstate capaity. Isan even (listril)uuonof income a favorableor unfavorable factorin relative capacity?One may answer affirmativelyon the ground thateven distributionre- duces extremes ofwealth andpoverty, neither of whuii is econom- ically desirable;hut he may alsoanswer negativelyon the ground that an evendistribution allows littlefree surplus (aboveneces- sary expenditures) andthat only suchfree surplus isa proper sub- ject for taxation.Regardless of thecorrect answer to thisquestion it illustrates theimportance of thetax ssLeni in determiningthe ability tosupport public functions.As a matter offact income is the basis foronly avery small proportionof state taxationand more taxes are basedupon income producedin a givenstate than upon theincome receivedby its residents.It might he possible fora state to havea relatively higheconomic capacity with relativelysmall potentialities(or revenuetinder existing tax institutions. Someof theecouoirnc power mightnot be con- vertible into fiscalpower.
I)r. \Vuellerhas mentionedattempts to takeaccount of tax institutions byestimating andcomparing yieldsof a modeltax system in thevarious states. Thisis obje tedto on the grounds that the choiceof a modeltax plan issubjective. Theobjection could be avoidedwere the actualtax plan employedinstead of a model one. Theactual tax planwould necessarilyrepresent a sort of COIISCflSUS ofprocedure inthe states. Forexample. the percentage of stateand localrevenue derivedfrom property. income, and salestaxes might beused to givethese taxesproper
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weight. The average rate of tax upon each of these bases might
he applied to determine relative fiscal capacities. The greatob-
jection to this proposal is that the statistics on the distributionof
wealth and sales by states are much less satisfactory than those
for the distribution of income received. Neverthelessthe use of
per capita net incomereceived as the sole criterion of fiscal
capacity when the tax system in many cases taxeseverything
except such net income, seemsimperfect.
IV GORDON KEITH
Dr. Wueller proposes that anindex of the fiscal capacities of the
several states to support selected servicesbe derived from the
per capita incomepaid out to the residents after allowance has
been made for federal drains. Inselecting per capita income as
the sole basis for his measurementof capacity, Dr. Wueller de.
liberately departs from the model tax planapproach to this prob-
lem by excluding the directcontributions of property and of
business enterprise from his index,and by making no allowance
for the effect of differentdistributions of income upon fiscal
capacity. I question both thetheoretical validity and the practical
wisdom of these exclusions.
While it is fair to ask whether propertythat does not yield an
income easily measurable in termsof money contributes any-
thing to the fiscal capacity of a state,it is hard to deny that a state
with much such capital withinits taxing jurisdiction is better
off than a state with little.The latter, if it is attempting toraise
the general welfare of itspeople, has more claims upon its income
than the former. Furthermore,property, whether it is income
yielding or not, is an existing sourceof tax revenue that cannot
be wholly discounted. If itis held to be desirable to give property
less weight in measuringfiscal capacity, it would seem tobe more
reasonable to effect such a changeunder the model tax plan than
to throw it out altogether, asDr. Wueller suggests.
Similarly the formal difficultyof estimating the extent ofthe
contribution business enterprisesmake to the fiscal capacityof
a state cannotjustify the exclusion ofsuch contributions when

















against income. Discussion of these two concepts cannot be en-
tirely separated.
Dr. Wueller points out that the use of estimated revenues
from model tax systems as measures of fiscal capacities has been
subjected to significant criticism, in part on the giounds that the
selection of models involves the investigators' preconceptions. It
is important to recognize, however, that the use of unadjusted
income data as indexes of fiscal capacities provides no absolute
solution for this problem. Such an approach merely assumes a
niodel tax system in which every dollar of income, within the
limitations of the concepts employed in the measurement thereof,
is equally taxable.'
In considering the problems inherent in the use of income data
in the construction of indexes of fiscal capacities, it might first
be profitable to consider a few generalizations2 on the nature of
the relation between our public and private economies. (a) Tax
structures are determined by public opinion, orpolitically effec-
tive sentiment. (b) Further, taxes take three general forms: levies
against income, transactions, and wealth. (c) The functioning of
our government units todayis such that it is extremely doubtful
that any differentiation can be made beyond thenational gov-
ernment on the one hand and a combinationof state-county-city-
minor divisions on the other.3 (d) There are claimsagainst tax
revenues that have a priority statusrelative to other ckims. (e)
There are claims against income of such a naturethat the
amounts thereof are less subject totaxation than the rest of
income.
The control of tax structures by public sentimentraises some
presumption that the assumed model tax systemshould be based
upon the existing system. Itis not reasonable to presume that
public sentiment will approve any assumed structurethat is radi-
cally different from the existing structure.Assumption of a
t Dr. Wueller implies that some dollars are not equallytaxable when he recoin-
mends deduction of federal tax collections from incomebefore computatioli of
indexes.
2 Subject, of coiiie, to the usual exceptions.
3 That is, there is a relatively distinct cleavage betweculthe SCI ICCS PCI lOIIIIC(l
by the federal givernm(Iit and by dl other goVCrIImClItunits. ihe dea;ige is







radically (Ii tIer cut structure may vel I tendto defeat the
PUrpose for which the assumption is made, sincethe inherentrigidity of the tax structure might prevent theraising of therevenue that is presumed in the indexes of fiscalcapacities. ThisConsideration is especially important because the ideaof variablegrants appar.
ently tends to become effective ingovernment policy whensuf- ficient revenue is not raised forperformance of aservice ata given level. There is merit, ofcourse, in the apj)Iicatjoflof the same model in all units.
If this interpretation of theimportance of existingtax struc- tures is accepted, some attentionmust be given to therelation between taxation and income.Existing taxstructures levy
against income, transactions,and wealth. 'Fhe Bureauof the Cen-
sus shows in official fIgures fori 931-32that only a smallpropor- tion of state and localrevenues were then derived fromtaxation of income as such andpart of this probablyrepresents taxes levied againstcorporate income. Because of the effectof exemp- tions and variabletax rates, even this smallproportion will prob-
ably not be related directlyto measures of income. Taxeslevied against wealthare taxes levied against valuationsof future in.
come or consumption and needbear no fixed relationto current income. Taxes leviedagainst transactionsare related to current
income perhapseven less directly.
The interlockingfunctioning of state,county, city, and minor
division governmentunits in the rendering ofservices may be readily demonstrated.4This interlockingbecomes important when the priorityof claims againsttax revenues is considered
because, granted thepriority, the adjustmentsto income figures
in recognition thereofwould need to be basedon the total costs of the servicesas rendered by all the differentunits. An illustra- tion of priority ofclaims to taxrevenues lies in the reasonable
4 Financigjl Statist irs ofSlate and Local Gopernme,,ts.iqa. Thesc are the latest official and comprehensisefigures.
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certainty that such services as the protection ofpersons and piop-
erty will be maintained at some level or degree before services
such as the payment of pensions to the agedare initiated.
The establishment of priorities is difficult. There isa possible
presumption, however, that the services first provided bygov-
ernment are the most important, although such a presumption is
subject to limitations imposed by changing public sentiment.
Perhaps more fruitful analysis could be made in terms of the
services first curtailed when government units have adopted pro-
grams of economy. To the extent that rationalizing fromthe
order of establishment or curtailment of services provides a basis
for determining priority of claims against tax revenues, this prob-
lem may be solved with relative ease. Ideally, however, the analy-
sis should be made in terms of levels of services and this treatment
would be more difficult. Perhaps some workable solution is de-
rivable by an assumption of priorities on the basis of some type
of analysis suggested above with an arbitrary assignment of pri-
ority to the service to be initiated, equalized, or expanded in
such position that expenditures for services of later priority
would tend to offset possible economies in expenditures for serv-
ices of earlier priority.' Of course, the whole idea of priority of
claims is necessarily based on the assumption that tax revenues
are limited.8
Some forms of income are not subject to taxation as income,
but they are relatively limited. All, or nearly all, income is sub-
jected to taxation when translated into consumption or savings.
More important is the fact that different forms of income, con
sumption, and savings are taxed at different rates. They are
taxed at different rates both because of their inherent nature and
because of their tendency to be identified with different classes
of income recipients. The emphasis today on taxation levied on
7 For instance, assume the existence of services A, B, C. and D and the proposal
to add service E. Analysis determines the priority ranking of A, B. C. and I)
in that order. We assign E to a position between C and D on the further as-
sumption that possible economies in the cost of A, B, and C will make It possible
to continue D at some level and render service E at a defined level. This is an
illustration, not a formula.
a If government had the means ol performing all conceivable services there would
be no problem as to which services to perform and at what level. This is obvious.
but its recognilion is important because it establishes priority as a function
of revenue.460
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the basis of so-called abilityto pay is clear in the heldof
taxation proper. To theextent that wealth andOh are Sitflj. Jarly (liStributed the tendencyis also clear fortaxation levied against wealth. The relationof taxation leviedagainsttIan,1(. tions to income is less clear.Perhaps no exact(lual1titltj-e solu- tion can be formulatedto express the relationof taxationto income, but the importanceof the coosidcratioiimight wellwar- rant the assumption ofsonic arbitrary per capitadeductio11 iroln income beforecomputation of indexes of fiscalcapacities. These many problemsmight seem to demolishthe case forthe use of income data in themaking of variablegrants were itnot that the existence ofa better basis for makingsuch grants hasuo been demonstrated.Pending the dcvelopmctnof a betterbasis, it might be wisestto make adjustmentsto income dataand to employ these adjustedfIgures in theonstruction of indexesoh fiscal capacity. Tueneed for adjustmentarises from thetwo ideas thesecomments have sought toestablish; not allincome dollars are equally taxable;a priority of claimagainst taxrevenues ex- ists. In general, thesolution to the firstproblem will be foundin detailed analysis ofincome by type ofpaylnciu,a and to thesec- ond in detailedanalysis of thestructure ofgovcrnmeii The adjustmentprocedure might followSome such patternas this: (a) Fromtotal paymentsorcome of each type in allunits to receive thegrants, deduct allcollections of taxesby the gov- ernment unit making thevariable grant, sincethe assumption of a Superior priority forsuch collectioiisis '-hal to thelogic of variable grants.° (b)From thenet totals abovesubtract some amounts totaling toan approxitnationof theanlount of income to which other claimsexist of prioritysuperior to oiliertax claims. This mightbe a standardarnottlit varied between locali- ties on the basisof relativecosts of a standai-d ofliving. Because all, or nearly all,income is subjectto taxation in its(IisJ)OSjtjOfl if Pending the dcseloj,meiitof Or °pplcflicrittnalsof sue distributions of income




not in its rC(:eipt, these deductionscaii be merely approximatiolls
to the amount of income pCr capitahot subject to taxation Ufl(lCr
the general pattern of taxationstandardized from existing tax
structures.'1 (c) Adjust the remainders forall units in suchman-
ner that each dollar of combined type of incomeor payment
totals will be equally taxable. Thisprocess would be essentially
one of applying different weights to differenttype of income pay-
ment remainders.12 (d) Convert the figures forall units adjusted
in step (c) to the level of thesum of the remainders (b) for all
units. This amount is gross potentialtax revenue by definition,
since prior claims to income have beendeducted in (a) and (b).
(e) From the gToss potentials above,subtract amounts deter-
mined to be superior claimson tax revenues. The resulting net
revenue potentials will serve as a basis for computing indexes of
fiscal capacity.
VI HANS NEISSER
Dr. Wueller's index is based on two premises, that 'ability'can
be measured approximately as average income in thestate, and
that 'needs' are approximately proportionateto population. I
shall not attempt to discuss here the validity of these standards;
rather I shall attempt to present the logic of the regional income
concept to be applied if these standards are accepted. The prob-
lem is: to what extent must federal taxes be consideredas reduc-
ing ability, and federal disbursementsas increasing it? From a
theoretical point of view, any state finds itself ina situation
strictly analogous to the situation of tIme nationas a whole in rela-
tion to foreign countries. Now, we define the available income in
the United States as given by the value of the net output plusor
minus the balance of the current debt payments from or to for-
eign countries; voluntary contributions sent abroad are not
treated as reducing available income.
11 Persons at or below these levels will pay taxes, but the ;InSotIflt of such taxes
should be approximately equivalent to the additional taxes peisotis above these
levels would have paid had all their income been stibjeU to taxation.
U Note that payments of (liffcrcnt types may be taxable (lirecily or intlimertly
more than 015CC and in ,iiorc than one jurisdiction. Further, this adjument or
equalization lutist also take care of the equation to income of taxes les icd against
transactions and wealth as well as income, consumption, and savings.462
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Correspondingly theavailableincome in a region
or state is equal to thevalue of thenet Output pLUSOf HUflLIScurrent debt payments fromor to 'abroad'; 'abroaddenotes herenot oni) the other states butalso the federalgovernment. The value of theprivate netoutput is equalto the sum ofnet incomes pluscost taxes minussubsidies. Costtaxes are alltaxes payable byan entrepreneur anddeductible fromhis taxablein- come. It does notmatter by whatauthority thesecost taxesare imposed, whetherby the stateor by the federal
government, but it matterswhere theyare imposed. Tariffduties, forexample, affect only theprice 0/importgoods, which donot representa part of the netoutput in thestate. On thesame groundsthe in- come in state A isnot affected byexcise taxesor sales taxesim- posed on capitalgoods producedin state Bby eitherfederal or state government,even if these goodsare exportedto and uti- lized instate A.
The 'publicincome' inany state is givenby thenet value of services performedin thestate by thegovernment, exclusiveof mere 'transferexpenditure'. Servicesof the federalgovernment are on thesame footingas services performedby thestate or mu- nicipalgovernment. A difficultyis created bythe centralizedserv- ices of thefederalgovernment, i.e., itsactivities inWashington, D. C., thecosts of thearmy and navy.etc. One caneither leave them out ofconsiderationor distributethemamong the states accordingto some standard.

























have to put, in the 'balance of payments'of the state concerned,
the 'federal reflux', i.e., payments from thefederal treasury to
the state rcgardlcss from whatsources or for what purpose. In
other words, the available income in thestate consists first of the
services of certain federal officers residing inthe state, and sec-
ond, of the income these officers receive fromWashington and
enjoy as members of the community theyare living in. To con-
vince oneself that flO double counting is involvedone has only
to consider the limiting case in which the total federal drain is
returned as salary for, say, federal judges residingin the state:
the net federal drain is zero and the services ofthe judges are a
part of the income in the state.
If the regional income, determined in theway just indicated.
is to be used as the basis for assigning federalgrants, then it must
not be overlooked that such grants would forma part of the fed-
eral reflux and, therefore, would increase the regionalincome.
The most logical thing to do is to include thegrant in question
in the 'hypothetical' regional income and tocompare it with the
'hypothetical' income in other regions. Otherwise, splittingtip
the grant in successive portions would affect the result.
Dr. Duties' comments on Dr. Wueiler's paperserve to bring to
the fore a confusion that seems to account for much of the failure
of the author and the other commentators tosee eye to eye. Dr.
Wueiler objects to model tax systems while Dr. Groves and Dr.
Keith defend them; Mr. Martin and to some extent Dr. Groves
suest that a particular model tax system is implicit in Dr.
Wueller's scheme and that this implicit system is undesirable
since it assumes all taxes directly related to income; Dr. Wueller's
reply seems to be that this is not a valid objection because the
assumption is not far from the truth, but that it would not mat-
ter even if the assutnption were far from the truth because the
additional tax income appears in the accounts as income of gov-
ernment officials; Dr. CoIm agrees with Dr. Wueller's conclusion
but for only the second of the two reasons advanced.













me, h resolved ifwe follow Lij) the hint thatDr. Dulles letsdrop. Dr. Groves, Dr.Keith. Mr. Maruu,and, I believe,l)r. (AiImin- terpret thePCE capita incomefigures primarilyas iniendedto mcasure i elative capacityto sec u ic reventies forgovernment functions, i.e.,as intended tomeasure relative fiscalcapacity. In their view, Dr.\Vueller takes theconcern of thegovernment unit that is contemplatingthe making ofgrants--preSUlnal)ly the fed- eralgovernmentas primarilythe maintenanceof t lie functions of thegovernments to whomthe grantsare nla(lepresuiflably the statesata level fairly uniformfrom stateto state. Thelevel of activitiesother than thosefinanced by publicbodies is taken to be either ofno concern or of oniysecondaryconcern to the government makingthe grants. IIthisinterpretationwere ac- cepted, and strictlyadhered to, theobjections of thecommenta- tots wQtIl(l haveto be grantedalmost completevalidity. The relevant questionfrom this pointof view is theamount thestates can raise asrevenues; and iftaxes based onor closely relatedto income donot provide thegreater part of therevenues of the states, it will bea pure accident ifper capitaiflCOiW is a good index of fiscalcapacity in thissense. Moreover, itis noanswer to this criticismthat thetax receiptsappear as theincome of gov- ernment officialsand thereforeare fully taken intoaccount h' measures of per capitaincome. This isthe samesort of lifting- oneself-by-the-bootstrapsargument as thecontention that because individuals spendtheir incomes,a particular finncan pay any amount to itsemployees, sincethe more itpays the more itgets back. Thepoint is thatSO far as part ofthe funds paidto govern- ment officialsare returnedto the state inthe form oftaxes, this merelymeans that thend cost ofgovernmentservices is less than the figuresentered in thebooks; and thelarger the totalsum paid to employees thegreater thereverse flow. Binobviously this in no way accountsor allows Ioidifferences inthe ease withwhich the fundsto meet thistie! costcan he obtaUle(lfrom the rest of the coinmunity--thereal pointat issue. Anotherinterpretation of thepurpose for whichthe per capita income figuresare to he used is,
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grants by the federal government would he to equalize the level
of real income among the states whether this income is provided
by public or private activities. From this point of view, the use of
per capita income can no longer be objected to on the grounds
that many taxes are neither based on nor closely related to in-
come. The character of the tax system will determine the rela-
tive share of public and private activities in a state's economy; it
will only indirectly affect the absolute level of 'real' income, ex-
cept as one state can through taxation divert to itself income
that would otherwise have gone to a different state. Further, the
inclusion of both the incomes of public officials and the taxes
paid out of income in measuring the per capita income of the
state is entirely valid and completelyai'.ws for the direct in-
fluence of differences in tax systems.
It is not entirely clear to which of these interpretations I)r.
Wueller adheres. His seemingly studied avoidance of the modi-
fier 'fiscal', his repeated reference to 'public andprivate econ-
omies' in discussing services, and the internal structureof his
argument all point, though by no meansunambiguously, to ad-
herence to the second interpretation.
A clear differentiation between the two interpretations sug-
gested serves to clear up several difficulties inaddition to those
already mentioned. Consider, for example, thequestion whether
federal drains should be deducted in computing percapita in-
come. If the per capita incomefigures are interpreted as measures
of fiscal capacity, the first interpretationand if there is a clear
separation between the functions of thefederal government and
of the state and local governments thenthe federal drains clearly
should be deducted, for they represent partof the income of the
state that cannot possibly beused to finance functions of the
state or local governments.On the other hand, if the per capita
income figures are interpreted as measuresof economic capacity,
the second interpretation the treatmentof federal drains de-
pends, in theory at least, entirely on the usemade of them. That
portion of the funds that is used toprovide services enjoyed by
the residents of a state, or that isreturned to the state in the form
of grants, clearly should not hededucted; the remainder equally
clearly should be deducted. (Theremainder might of course he
either positive or negative.)DISCUSSION 467
residents is higher the larger the size of community inwhich they
reside. Because of the greater importance of large cities in New
York per capita income in New York State would, underthese
conditions, be considerably higher thanper capita income in
Alabama. In making equalizing grants based onmeasures of per
capita income, funds would be raised in New York State and
transferred to Alabama. The net result, in the absence ofat-
tempts to equalize incomes within the states, would be that the
poor farmer in Alabama would be subsidized, and the equally
poor farmer in New York taxed! If the differences among sizes of
community in average income reflected in the main differences
in cost of living, the end product would he even more undesir-
able. In that case, equal standards of living in two states would
necessarily be rendered unequal by equalizing grants. This tend-
ency would be even stronger if, as Dr. Coim suggests, the cost of
rendering the services supported by the grants varied in the same
manner as cost of living in general.
I am not of course suggesting that the hypothetical situations I
have outlined are correct and adequate representations of the ex-
isting situation. But the chance that they are not completely
unreal seems sufficiently great to raise a serious question as to the
wisdom of utilizing state per capita income figures as the basis
for apportioning equalizing grants before the nature of state dif-
ferences in per capita income and of size of community differ-
ences in cost of living are thoroughly investigated.
VIII P. H. WUELLER
I should like to take this opportunity to call attention to an
apparent misunderstanding between myself and the commenta-
tors on my paper. As Mr. Friedman has pointed out, one "may
interpret"' my suggestions as being concerned with the proxi-
'In the spirit of 'vindictiveness'. I beg leave to point out that, in my opinion.
Mr. Friedman's phrase "may interpret" accords the commentators a inore lavish
measure of the benetit of doubt than they are entitled to. In partial stibstantiation
d this opinion, it may be pointed out that, seemingly, only two of the seven
commentators (Gordon Keith and J. L. Martin) criticize my proposal on the as-
sumption that the formulation and quantification of some concept of liacal capacity
is the issue under comideration, Dr. Groves, on the other hand, though observingI
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terms of the investigator's Preconceptionas to the 'ploper' rela-
tion of the private to the public economy.Again, use 0 theaver-
age tax system seems unsatisfactory, because to betruly repre-
sentative it would make extensiveuse of capital values for tax
base purposes.4
Third, Mr. Martin, though apparentlyaccepting inCome as a
basic capacity gauge, proposes to use themeasure in a somewhat
different manner from that suggested byme. Mr. Martin seems
to object to the suggested use of income dataon two grounds. In
the first place, he seems to be of theOpinion that the suggested
approach implies subscription to the postulatethat "all income
dollars are equally taxable". Second, he feels that"a priority of
claims against revenue exists" which the suggestedapproach al-
legedly disregards. Mr. Martin's first contentionseems to lose its
relevance if it is clearly realized that I aimedat suggesting a ineas-
ure of economic rather than fiscal capacity. In considering Mr.
Martin's second contention, it is well to remember thatone of
the purposes of variable ratio grants is to change the "existing
priority of claims against tax revenue".3
In conclusion, it ma be perinissil)le to call attentionto some
of the possible objectives of federal-state variable ratio matching
grants. As Dr. Dulles has pointed out, different interests may wish
to use the federal-state variable grant device for different pur-
poses. To clarify my position, I should like to state that through-
out my paper, I proceeded upon the assumption that it was the
purpose of federal variable grants to facilitate some degree of
equalization of service offerings.
Last, as regards the probable degree of equalization that could
reasonably be expected if federal-state variable grants were incor-
porated into the contemporary institutional framework, I share
Mr. Friedman's point of view. He suggests that at least iii those
4 Cf., ibid.
5 To the extent that Mr. Martin's priority argument is a logical derivative
of his claim with resjecL to the alleged rigidity of tax systems, it is of doubtful
validity. The term 'rigid', which Mr. Martin applies to statc tax systems, is HoL
meaningful unless related to some point of reference. Some such necessary rela-
tion Mr. Martin fails to establish. However, tax systems, that is, the absolute
and relative yield of specific tax bases, nominal and effective rates carried by
specific bases, as well as the relative magnittide of total revenue fractions devoted
to specific purposes, exhibit higher rates of change than some basic series such
as income paid out, population, volume of product. and sales.